NTT Critique
The main contention of the current version of Name the Trait version 5 rests on the conditional statement from P1: P1) If your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value, then your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P. The objection explores the possibilities of the meanings of trait-equalization, how they could be structured, while also including a concept of retaining moral value as well as the following "then statements" assertion that the only way to deny the non-human animal is through contradiction. It shows that there is no coherent or true framing that contains all these concepts at once. 1) A trait is to mean all possible propositions one could say about an object, including one's own disposition towards that objection, as has been previously stated. If this is in any way denied and made into a subset of possibilities, then contradiction will not be the only possible way to deny moral value, as the remaining propositions can instead be a substituted objection. 2) Equalization is to make 2 (or more) objects the same. This is taken as distinct from differentiation, which we take distinct objects and judge comparatively. It is possible that NTT could be formulated to be sound and coherent with such concepts as differentiation and nothing being equalized. But since equalization is a pivotal part of the argument and that there are supporting statements from AY explaining what equalization is, as well as an animated gif, we shall make all objections take these supporting explanations into account. 3) Moral value can be thought of as an ontological property of an object or as a disposition of the person in question towards an object. In no meaningful sense can it be said something "retained" moral value if I was presented 3 objects and I valued them all the same. In order for any coherent sense of "retainment" to be the case, we must be talking about the same thing multiple times, not separate things I am judging individually, even if those judgments are the same. It would make as much to provide me with 3 objects that are 40lbs and say "they have retained weight". It is not that weight has been "kept", but instead presented 3 different distinct times in 3 different distinct ways. Moral retainment makes sense in the context of a single trackable object, again supported by the supporting statements of AY and the documentation. If the argument is changed to mean "Making a set of distinct objects between A and B", then equalization and retainment are incorrect word choices. Objections will be made with this in mind. 4) Any situation that allows any distinction what so ever, any propositional statement that could exist and rightfully make a distinction to one's propositional attitude or an ontological difference between objects will render the conditional false. Contradiction can stand as the "Only denial" if there remains no differences what-so-ever. Any allowed distinction will be a basis upon which the conclusion can be said to be false. 5) My attitude towards objects can be affected on the basis of watching and remembering an object change (This shall be later referred to as "The history") and value can be assigned on this basis. It is an acceptable trait as it is a possible true propositional statement. A denial of this is to only allow a subset of traits, rendering the conclusion false. (As per 4). If the above is true, this leaves us with 3 possible understandings of the premise: 1) Everything is equalized except for the identities and the histories. This is coherent but due to (4), renders the conditional to not follow. This is not an acceptable way to frame the argument. 2) Everything is equalized, including the identities and the histories are merged. Moral value could be said to have been retained. This would render an object that is both A and not A, as the histories report that it was always A and was also not A, breaking the law of identity and making the argument incoherent. This is not an acceptable way to frame the argument. 3) Everything is equalized by destroying the history of one of the objects (As it is framed in the argument, it is the "Given Human" that is edited to be the same as the "Given non-human") thus denying the trait-equalization ever occurred. This would mean that "moral retainment" as a concept no longer works, as we have denied the object's existence that could have retained moral value, thus making my denial of moral value to the "given non-human" not a contradiction with anything I had previously done. This is not an acceptable way to frame the argument. STEELMANNING NTT 1) By not using words like "equalization" or "moral retainment" and instead, replacing them with "trait differentiation" and "equal moral value judgments", we can construct a similar argument with the same basic point and the same conclusion. If equal moral value judgments are too strict (Perhaps we want to allow for minor changes to moral judgments, such as losing out on consequential considerations) then we can specifically state "Equal moral value judgements disallowing the object to be killed and eaten within a given context". (Obviously, we don't want desert island survival situations to be the context). 2) Specific equal moral value judgments have distinct advantages over "moral retainment" as a concept. One, it doesn't need to attach to an identity to make sense. Two, one cannot agree to all premises and say "It's not okay to eat the human, but it is okay to eat the cow" on the basis that, while they both kept moral value, the nature of that value changed. (This, of course, could be countered by making it a "Specific moral retainment", but this would only deal with 1 of the 2 issues) 3) Trait differentiation could be thought of as a set of objects in between A and B. This can be formulated one of two ways: One, the trait differentiation process Takes A, makes a set of different identities and moves it towards B in similarity, stopping at history as the last remaining trait before the next object is B. If you affirm that all identities do in fact have equal specific moral values, then truly you would be in contradiction by denying equal specific moral values. Two, the trait differentiation process just presents a list of objects all at once between A and B in similarity. Retainment doesn't need to exist so nothing needs to be tracked. The same as above occurs. Both of these would be sound and coherent. Since writing this, it appears that AY has been describing the "Trait Equalization Process" a lot like the steelmanned version I have written. Note that I wrote this when both his verbal description was "Take two objects and a list of traits of both of them. Swap them one at a time until they are both the same" and a visual representation of two circles named A and B, making them the same, and saying there was no difference between them. All of the objections above pertained to that. Given that those were the initial descriptions, as well as the fact that "equalization" and "retainment" are now misnomers leftover from those descriptions, the new description of the process is a post-hoc attempt to fix the argument. (Perhaps discarding hilarious other excuses like "nowhere in the argument does it say it accepts the identity of indiscernibles." Apparently rules regarding logic are supposed to be written into every syllogism now.) I consider it a concession to use my method of steelmanning and abandoning his old description, but still think the argument is incorrectly written and should fix its misnomers.